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SELF-INCRIMINATION
N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 6:
No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.
U.S. CONST. amend. V:
No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.
COURT OF APPEALS
People v. Vargasl
(decided June 13, 1995)
Defendant Manny Vargas appealed his conviction of second
degree murder and criminal possession of a weapon.2 Vargas
argued that the prosecution committed a reversible error that
deprived him of a fair trial when the prosecution deliberately
called a witness, whom they knew would assert his privilege
against self-incrimination, 3 for the sole purpose of using that
assertion against the defendant. 4 The New York Court of Appeals
held that the prosecution unfairly prejudiced the defendant and
deprived him of a fair trial when they used a witness' assertion of
his privilege against self-incrimination against the defendant. 5
The court further held that a curative instruction could not undo
the unfairness which resulted from the impression left by the
1. 86 N.Y.2d 215, 654 N.E.2d 1221, 630 N.Y.S.2d 973 (1995).
2. 86 N.Y.2d at 217, 654 N.E.2d at 1222, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself .... " Id. See also N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This section
provides in pertinent part: "No person shall... be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself.. ." Id.
4. Vargas, 86 N.Y.2d at 217-20, 654 N.E.2d at 1222-24, 630 N.Y.S.2d
at 974-76.
5. Id. at 222, 654 N.E.2d at 1225, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 977.
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witness' repeated invocation of his right to be free from self-
incrimination. 6
On April 9, 1987, Ms. Lourdes Caban was found murdered in
her car. 7 Along with her body, the police found school books
belonging to Anthony Arlequin, the defendant's cousin.8 The
police questioned Arlequin for several hours at the 60th
Precinct. 9 There, he implicated the defendant in Caban's
murder. 10 Subsequently, the police brought Arlequin to the 84th
Precinct "where he repeated his statement to an Assistant District
Attorney, who preserved the statement on audiotape.''1 This
admission, in conjunction with a purportedly incriminating
remark made by the defendant to a friend and the statement of an
eyewitness who saw the defendant's car flee the scene, led to the
defendant's arrest. 12 Defendant was indicted for murder in the
second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second
degree. 13
At trial, the prosecution called as their witness Anthony
Arlequin, the defendant's cousin. Outside the jury's presence,
Arlequin asked for an attorney claiming his previous statement,
given at the 60th Precinct, was a lie. 14 His request was granted
and he finished testifying with his "attorney by his side." 15 His
testimony was replete with Fifth Amendment assertions. 16 After
Arlequin's testimony, the court advised the prosecution that if
they were to call Arlequin to the stand to testify, they could only
ask questions on matters upon which he did not invoke his Fifth
Amendment privilege. 17
6. Id.
7. Id. at 217, 654 N.E.2d at 1222, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 218, 654 N.E.2d at 1222, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 218, 654 N.E.2d at 1223, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
17. Id. at 218-19, 654 N.E.2d at 1223, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
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Two days later, the prosecution called Arlequin to the stand in
front of the jury.18 The prosecution focused on questions similar
to those which were previously asked outside of the jury's
presence, which again warranted a Fifth Amendment assertion. 19
Against the defendant's request, the court refused to strike his
testimony. 20 However, the court did instruct the jury that it was
the witness' constitutional right to invoke such a privilege and no
inferences should be drawn from such an invocation.2 1
During summation, the prosecutor stated that the reason
Arlequin invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege was that he was
involved in Caban's murder and he did not want to implicate
himself.22 The prosecutor further suggested that the witness was
not interested in discussing the incident in court. The prosecutor
stated:
[He knows more than he wants to say.., he is covering for this
defendant, for this defendant, his cousin. He knows what
happened and he won't tell us... we know from the evidence
he was there... if somebody else killed a wife of his cousin[,]
brutally executed her, why wouldn't he say who it is... The
only reason he is not telling us is because he is protecting [his
cousin]. 23
The defense attorney's repeated objections throughout the
prosecution's summation were overruled because, according to
the court, the "jury may consider the evidence it has heard." 24
The prosecution continued to refer to Arlequin's invocation of the
Fifth Amendment as an indication that Arlequin was protecting
his cousin and did not want to "pin" the murder on him.25 At the
end of trial, the court again instructed the jury that a witness may
invoke his constitutional right against self-incrimination. 2 6
18. Id. at 219, 654 N.E.2d at 1223, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 220, 654 N.E.2d at 1223-24, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 975-76.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 220, 654 N.E.2d at 1223, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
26. Id. at 220, 654 N.E.2d at 1223-24, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 975-76.
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Further, "the jury should not speculate" as to what the witness'
answers may or may not be, nor should they view the refusal to
answer as favorable or not to either party. 27
The issue presented on appeal was whether the prosecution
committed reversible error when, knowing prior to trial that the
witness would assert his Fifth Amendment privilege, they
deliberately called that witness for the sole purpose of eliciting
that privilege in court and using that assertion against the
defendant. 28
Since Justice Hand's decision in United States v. Maloney,29
courts have been extremely aware that a defendant's right to a
fair trial may be infringed upon when a witness refuses to answer
on the grounds that the witness may incriminate himself.30 Based
on this awareness, courts have determined that when the
prosecution calls a witness whom they know will assert his Fifth
Amendment right, reversible error is committed. 31
The Vargas court cited the Supreme Court decision in Namet v.
United States.32 In Namet, the Supreme Court recognized two
instances where reversible error may be found when a witness
invokes his Fifth Amendment right. 33 The first is "prosecutorial
misconduct. '' 34 The Supreme Court held that it is a reversible
error when the prosecution makes a "conscious and flagrant
attempt to build its case out of inferences arising from use of the
27. Id. at 220, 654 N.E.2d at 1224, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
28. Id. at 217, 654 N.E.2d at 1222, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
29. 262 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1959).
30. Id. at 537. "[T]he prosecution knew that [the witnesses] would refuse
to answer, and it seems to us that the interest of the accused should prevail
over that of the prosecution, and that the judgment should not stand, for the
questions touched vital elements of the charge." Id.
31. Vargas, 86 N.Y.2d at 221, 654 N.E.2d at 2224, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
See People v. Pollock, 21 N.Y.2d 206, 212-13, 234 N.E.2d 223, 226, 287
N.Y.S.2d 49, 53 (1967) (calling a witness for the purpose of eliciting a Fifth
Amendment claim constitutes prejudicial error); cf. People v. Berg, 59 N.Y.2d
294, 298-99, 451 N.E.2d 450, 451, 464 N.Y.S.2d 703, 704 (1983) (holding
that a good faith effort to illicit testimony does not constitute reversible error).
32. 373 U.S. 179 (1963).
33. Id. at 186-87.
34. Id. at 186.
1178 [Vol 12
4
Touro Law Review, Vol. 12 [2020], No. 3, Art. 62
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss3/62
SELF-INCRJMINATION
testimonial privilege." 35 The second instance where reversible
error may be found is where the witness' refusal to answer adds
weight to the prosecution's case thereby unfairly prejudicing the
defendant. 36
According to the Vargas court, the Supreme Court of the
United States, in Namet, laid out a paradigm for courts to utilize
in evaluating the prosecution's management of a witness'
testimony when that witness invokes his Fifth Amendment
privilege.37 The trial court must determine "whether the
probative value of the testimony of the witness who invoked the
Fifth Amendment privilege in the presence of the jury outweighs
any prejudice to the defendant."38 The Vargas court evaluated
the prosecution's conduct and held that their conduct during
questioning and summation fell under both categories, an attempt
by the prosecutor to build his case out of inferences drawn by the
assertion of a testimonial privilege and undue prejudice.39 Thus,
the court held that the "prejudicial effect of Arlequin's testimony
to defendant outweighed the negligible relevant information he
provided, and.., no curative instruction could temper the
impression created by his repeated invocation of the Fifth
Amendment in response to the prosecutor's pointed questions." 40
The prosecution questioned Arlequin on many matters of which
they knew, prior to trial, that he would assert his Fifth
Amendment right to avoid;41 thus, forcing the witness to
reiterate, in front of the jury, that he was asserting his testimonial
privilege. During summation, they used Arlequin's assertions to
their advantage by making numerous references to the fact that
Arlequin refused to answer because he wanted to protect the
defendant and not reveal their involvement in Cuban's murder. 42
35. Id.
36. Id. at 187.
37. People v. Vargas, 86 N.Y.2d 215, 221-22, 654 N.E.2d 1221, 1224-
25, 630 N.Y.S.2d 973, 976-77 (1995).
38. Id. at 222, 654 N.E.2d at 1225, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 977.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 222-23, 654 N.E.2d at 1225, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 977.
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Despite the judge's charge to the jury that the jury should not
make any negative inferences when a witness asserts his Fifth
Amendment privilege, the prosecution's conduct led to an unfair
trial for the defendant. 43 Thus, the New York Court of Appeals
reversed and ordered a new trial.44
In sum, under both the Federal and New York Constitution,
reversible error may be committed when the prosecution calls a
witness for the sole purpose of using his or her assertion of the
privilege against self-incrimination against the defendant.
Respectfully enforcing the United State Supreme Court's decision
in Namet, the New York Court of Appeals held that reversible
error may be committed where the prosecution makes a
"conscious and flagrant attempt to build its case out of inferences
arising from use of the testimonial privilege" 45 or where a
witness's invocation of the privilege unduly prejudices the
defendant. 46
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Spinelli 47
(decided September 15, 1995)
The defendant, Thomas Spinelli, was convicted in the Supreme
Court, Queens County of second-degree manslaughter and moved
to have this verdict reversed on the ground that his right against
self-incrimination was violated. 4 8 The Appellate Division,
43. Id.
44. Id. at 224, 654 N.E.2d at 1226, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
45. See Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 186 (1963).
46. Id. at 187.
47. 214 A.D.2d 135, 631 N.Y.S.2d 863 (2d Dep't 1995).
48. Id. at 138, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 864. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall [any person] be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.; N.Y. CONST.
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